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14 Nietzsche and Freud:
The ‘I’ and Its Drives
The parallels of Nietzsche with Freud are a matter of common knowledge; much
less well appreciated are their differences. My aim in this paper is to underscore
and arrive at a better understanding of the latter. I will suggest that the agree-
ment of Nietzsche with Freud regarding certain fundamental matters of human
psychology coexists with very deep philosophical disagreement. From one angle
Nietzsche and Freud can fairly be described as engaged on a common project.
Closer examination reveals that their shared territory is better viewed as the
result of a crossing of paths, on the way to different and mutually exclusive des-
tinations. The disagreement of Nietzsche and Freud with one another is, I will
suggest, ultimately no less intense than their argument with arch-rationalists
such as Kant.
1. Viewed from an appropriate distance–on a canvas sufficiently broad to make
salient their common opposition to the Kantian image of human beings–
Nietzsche and Freud appear to be seeking the same kind of result: a naturalistic
reconstrual of human personality which disabuses us of rationalistic prejudices,
destroys illusions of spirituality, and alerts us to the necessity of embarking on a
new task of self-understanding, the success of which promises some ameliora-
tion of our condition. As the familiar narrative has it, Nietzsche and Freud, fol-
lowing in the path of Spinoza and Hume, are engaged on a common diagnostic
and therapeutic enterprise, the crux of which is exposure of the true Nature
within us. Ignorance and denial of this buried motivational core is responsible
for our present sickness; knowledge of it has the potential to facilitate (though it
by no means guarantees) a gain in health.¹ The claims of both thinkers are
radical, revisionary, and candidly immodest. Freud does not share Nietzsche’s
1 See, famously, BGE 23, regarding the demand that “psychology again be recognized as the
queen of the sciences, and that the rest of the sciences exist to serve and prepare for it. Because,
from now on, psychology is again the path to the most fundamental problems” (Nietzsche 2002:
24 [KGW VI/2: 33]); and BGE 230: “To translate humanity back into nature; to gain control of the
many vain and fanciful interpretations and incidental meanings that have been scribbled and
drawn over that eternal basic text of homo natura so far; to make sure that, from now on, the
human being will stand before the human being, just as he already stands before the rest of
nature today, hardened by the discipline of science […]” (Nietzsche 2002: 123 [KGWVI/2: 175]).
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prophetic tone, yet both thinkers regard themselves as preparing for a new stage
of modernity, profiting from the gains in knowledge and increased critical
awareness accumulated over the course of the Enlightenment but offering
unprecedented insight into the underlying dynamics of human existence. The
transformation in self-conception urged by Nietzsche and Freud involves not
just revising basic beliefs but also conceptual change: cherished notions of indi-
vidual freedom and rational self-determination are shown to be empty or inco-
herent, and to stand in need of reconstructive surgery if they are to regain
credibility.
The psychological claims on which Nietzsche and Freud concur, and which
are of key importance for their shared naturalistic emancipatory ambition,
centre on the notion of drive, Trieb. The relevant Nietzschean-Freudian concep-
tion of drive is that of an enduring motivational state with broad scope which
overtakes and subsumes, without displacing, explanation in terms of reasons
for action: our ordinary conception of ourselves as doing things because we
believe this and desire that, is embedded in a motivational context which out-
strips conscious rational awareness and yet receives expression through and in
the agent’s conscious purposes. Human action emerges from drive analysis as
having a complex structure in which the end projected by the agent realizes a
further end which the agent does not and normally could not recognize, let
alone endorse, but in the absence of which their avowed reasons for action
would have no force. Understanding agency in drive terms requires therefore a
kind of double vision: we continue to see agents as acting for reasons, while
also seeing that the ground of the causality of their reasons (the explanation for
their having reasons for action at all, and the full explanation for those reasons
being determinately thus and not otherwise) is not given within the perspective
of rational agency. To invoke drive in the Nietzsche-Freud sense is thus neither
to merely postulate a specific origin for desires–as when the aetiology of a want
is traced back to a bodily need–nor to merely identify a causal tendency of
action extending beyond the agent’s awareness–as when social psychology
offers functional explanation of individual actions. Drives are neither mere
causal antecedents nor mere further effects of actions, but present, realized, in
them.
To view agents in these terms is to impute a division within the human
subject, between the agent qua executor of reasons for action, and the agent qua
bearer or vehicle or medium of drive. It is natural to conceptualize this contrast
in two sets of terms: as a distinction of agency and passivity (the agent is active
in the first respect and passive in the second), and as a distinction of psychologi-
cal appearance from psychological reality (the consciously endorsed reason
is the outer shell containing and concealing the true meaning of the action).
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Putting the two together, we arrive at the idea that the agent is active with
respect to psychological appearances, but passive with respect to psychological
reality. Devaluation of reflective consciousness, denial of free will, and the con-
ception of intellectual activity as subservient to motivation, are familiar corol-
laries of the drive model.
This is an abstract, purely formal characterization of the notion of drive.
The content that Freud attributes to drives has a distinctively naturalistic charac-
ter–a close relation to bodily states, intense affective quality, a high degree of
indeterminacy as regards its aim, insensitivity to discursive representations,
independence from norms, and so forth. Nietzsche too, at some junctures, also
characterizes drives in such terms, and when he does so often exhibits striking
similarity with Freud. If one were to enter into the detail concerning the conver-
gence of Nietzsche and Freud regarding substantial issues in drive psychology,
there are several obvious candidates for inclusion: the similarities of Nietzsche’s
account of the genesis of human civilization in On the Genealogy of Morals with
Freud’s account in Civilization and its Discontents, both emphasizing the sacri-
fice of instinctual satisfaction required; the thesis that morality, as defined by
the phenomenon of guilt and the operations of conscience, has its psychological
origin in an act of internalization, whereby outward-directed aggressive im-
pulses are redirected back onto the self; and the notion that, in addition to
instinctual repression, a diversion of drives in a new direction, whereby psychic
energies are reattached to a new content–sublimation, as Freud calls it– is
responsible for the higher products of human culture, including art.²
2. The basic respect in which Nietzsche and Freud are of one mind having
been stated, let us now turn to what separates them. I start with a historical
observation.
Nietzsche is prominent among Freud’s precursors as a champion of natura-
listic depth psychology, and he undoubtedly has a place among Freud’s forma-
tive influences, but there is no historical dependence as such. The historical
sources of psychoanalytic theory, studies have shown, are multiple and wide-
ranging. The precise extent of Freud’s knowledge of Nietzsche is hard to deter-
mine, but it is unlikely that Freud at any point studied Nietzsche’s writings in a
systematic fashion, or if he did so, then it was some time after the inception of
psychoanalysis. If we are looking for a single precursor for Freud’s concept of
the unconscious, then it is Schopenhauer who offers the closest approximation:
2 For detailed discussion, see Assoun 2000. Of particular interest, on sublimation, is Gemes
2009.
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the central tenets of the drive model are articulated very clearly in The World as
Will and Representation, and (I will be arguing) the features of Nietzsche’s
thought which set him apart from Freud are absent from Schopenhauer.
Will is considered by Schopenhauer in various forms: of relevance here is
the individuated will of each human subject, which constitutes their essential
core–“the primary and substantial thing”, “what is real and essential in man”,
“the radical part of our real nature”, our “true self, the kernel of our inner
nature”.³ Though itself lacking the power of understanding, the individuated
personal will is attached to a particular stock of representations: it makes the
individual’s decisions and determines her motives, which frequently remain
unknown to the intellect, and it is this will, rather than memory, which constitu-
tes personal identity.⁴ Only a fraction of its operations are manifest in conscious-
ness and self-consciousness.⁵ Many of Schopenhauer’s specific psychological
hypotheses, concerning the mechanisms by means of which the contents of con-
sciousness are determined by unconscious ends, and the pervasion of motiva-
tion by sexuality, have a striking psychoanalytic resonance.⁶
Schopenhauer’s concept of will or drive has, of course, sources of its own,
and is not be isolated from the broader current of theorizing about human per-
sonality which occupied so many Romantic idealists. What distinguishes Scho-
penhauer from other naturphilosophisch psychologists and gives his view a dis-
tinctively late modern, proto-Freudian quality, is his forthright denial of
purpose and value to the source of human motivation: our drives are not for
Schopenhauer the vehicles of providential metaphysical forces, raising the
human subject to a higher level of perfection and uniting her with the Absolute,
but bare impulsions, no more internally connected to the Good than is the force
of gravity. This austere conception carries over straightforwardly to Freud’s
vision of the psyche as, at the most basic level of its description, a neural
mechanism governed by the principle of homeostasis. The blindness of Scho-
penhauerian will is mirrored in the non-intentionality of pleasure, as Freud con-
3 WWR II, Ch. 19, “On the Primacy of theWill in Self-Consciousness”, pp. 205, 215, 219, 239. Scho-
penhauer generally uses Wille where Nietzsche would talk of Trieb, tending to reserve Trieb for
will in organic nature (e.g. the Trieb to self-preservation).
4 WWR II, 209–210 and 238–239, where the relation of the personal will to the individual’s intel-
ligible character is indicated. See Janaway 2010.
5 Schopenhauer (2010 [1839]: 50–51): self-consciousness “is a very limited part of our whole con-
sciousness, dark in its interior, with all of its objective cognitive powers completely externally
directed […] The outside, then, lies before its eyes with great brightness and clarity. But inside it is
as obscure as a well-blackened telescope.”
6 See my “Schopenhauer, Will and Unconscious”, Part I (Gardner 1999: 376–380).
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ceives it: there is no more intrinsic purposiveness to the discharge of psychic
energy in accordance with Freud’s principle of constancy than there is to the
objectification of will in the world as representation. For both Schopenhauer
and Freud, purposiveness is therefore not a genuine property of human agency
as such, but an appearance which arises from inside the perspective of the
willing subject in consequence of our capacity for abstract representation
(which is all that reason amounts to).
If Freud stands in a direct line of descent from Schopenhauer, appropriating
the naturalism of his theory of will while discarding its metaphysical aspect,
and if Nietzsche’s project has at its foundation a critical reaction against Scho-
penhauer, then Nietzsche’s argument with Schopenhauer may be expected to
resurface in his relation to Freud. I will return to this in the final section.
3. Having begun to separate Freud from Nietzsche on a historical plane, I now
want to draw attention to a vital but neglected difference between their respec-
tive psychologies. The drive model described above fits Freud squarely, but in
Nietzsche’s case there are complications.
Freud’s metapsychology draws sharp distinctions between different parts of
the mind, characterizing each in discrete functional terms, and apportioning to
each a different type of mental content. The result is a clear distinction in psy-
choanalytic explanation between, on the one side, propositional attitudes and
other states of the sort ascribed in ordinary (‘folk’) psychology, and on the other
side, the unconscious items postulated by Freud in order to explain irrational
configurations of propositional attitudes and other phenomena (dreams, obses-
sive-compulsive disorders, etc.) into which ordinary psychology lacks insight.
The explanantia of psychoanalysis comprise wishes, phantasies, unconscious
affects, repressed contents, instinctual representatives, thing-presentations, etc.,
and these entities are what give substance and determinacy to our unconscious
drives. The mental states on which psychoanalytic explanations turn are there-
fore not propositional attitudes (in so far as they draw content from Cs., it is in a
radically altered, degraded form) and their interaction does not conform to the
principles of rationality: the formation and transformation of unconscious repre-
sentations according to the laws of primary process is a form of mental activity
not straightforwardly recognizable as thinking. All this marks off the uncon-
scious proper, Ucs., from the mere preconscious, Pcs., the contents of which are
of a kind that can be entertained in consciousness but which are contingently
inaccessible. Mental life thus divides into two interlocked but separate domains
each with its own set of constitutive principles, and which are not to be con-
fused with one another: the representations circulating in Ucs. are not of a kind
with the beliefs that we consciously entertain about objects in the world; the
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fantasies entertained in conscious day-dreaming are not the phantasies that
give shape to unconscious mental life; the wishes of Ucs. are not of the same
nature as the wish to drive a fast car or be young again; the exclusion of unwel-
come thoughts from consciousness by self-distraction is not the same process as
repression; and so on.
In this respect, if in no other, psychoanalysis’ claim to the title of Wis-
senschaft should be upheld: Freud’s metapsychological writings present a
theory of the mind composed of laws and inter-defined theoretical entities, and
the psychoanalytic explanation of concrete individuals, evidenced in case his-
tories, gives explicit application to this theory.
Nietzsche is not, and does not pretend to be, wissenschaftlich in the same
manner. Nietzsche’s psychological explanations employ crucially the notion of
drive, and the contrast of conscious/unconscious, but nowhere does Nietzsche
set out a unified account of mental structure or formulate a basic set of psycho-
logical laws, and the various psychological analyses that Nietzsche offers are left
unintegrated.⁷ Questions that arise when we attempt to coordinate Nietzsche’s
psychological discussions across his texts are difficult to answer, and it would
be hard to maintain that they show a steady growth of psychological doctrine
comparable in any way to Freud’s continual elaborations and revisions of psy-
choanalytic thought (narratives of Nietzsche’s development focus on many
things, but none, to the best of my knowledge, locate its underlying motor in
psychological theory as such).
From this it cannot be inferred that Nietzsche regards systematic psychologi-
cal theory as either impossible or profitless. What is however of significance–
and stands in the way of the suggestion that Freud furnishes Nietzsche with the
explicit metapsychology that he happens to be missing–is the fact that
Nietzsche does not draw distinctions of mental kinds parallel to those drawn by
psychoanalysis: Nietzsche does not reserve for unconscious states a special set
of properties, and his characterizations of drives are nowise conceptually
uniform.⁸
In some contexts Nietzsche’s conception of a drive is indeed, as said earlier,
in line with Freud’s. References to the sexual drive provide obvious examples
7 The doctrine of will to power is, to be sure, some sort of general theory of drives, but whatever
we make of it, it does not perform the function of Freud’s metapsychology, as I hope to make
clear.
8 This point is argued convincingly and in detail by Thomas Stern, in “Against Nietzsche’s
Theory of the Drives” (manuscript). On Nietzsche’s conception of drives, see Richardson 1996,
Ch. 1, Poellner 1995: 213–229, Katsafanas 2013, and Leiter 2002: 91–105.
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–“Pity and love of mankind as development of the sexual drive”⁹–and the
extended use of cruelty in Essay Two of On the Genealogy of Morals parallels, as
already noted, Freud’s claims concerning the role of aggression in the formation
of civilization and morality.¹⁰ It is also true that at certain points, such as the fol-
lowing, Nietzsche makes a general claim about the nature of drives that accords
well with Freud’s view of the distinctively sub-rational mode of operation of the
unconscious:
As every drive lacks intelligence, the viewpoint of “utility” cannot exist for it [so ist “Nüt-
zlichkeit” gar kein Gesichstpunkt für ihn]. Every drive, in as much as it is active, sacrifices
force and other drives: finally it is checked; otherwise it would destroy everything through
its excessiveness. Therefore: the “unegoistic”, self-sacrificing, imprudent, is nothing
special–it is common to all the drives–they do not consider the advantage of the whole
ego (because they do not consider at all! [weil sie nicht denken!]), they act “contrary to our
advantage”, against the ego and often for the ego–innocent in both cases!¹¹
Nietzsche’s practice does not however bear out this conception consistently, and
Essay Two of On the Genealogy of Morals is not typical: more often than not,
Nietzsche attributes to unconscious items the very same kinds of properties pos-
sessed by conscious, avowable mental states. This shows itself at every turn.
Nietzsche refers to drives directed at “[h]atred, delight in the misfortunes of
others, the lust to rob and rule, and whatever else is called evil”,¹² to “the drive
to appropriate and the drive to submit [den Aneignungstrieb und den Unterwer-
fungstrieb]”,¹³ and to the virtues of “diligence, obedience, chastity, piety,
justice” as drives “mostly harmful to their possessors”.¹⁴ A drive is responsible
for our believing that our sensations have causes: the “Ursachentrieb” “allows”
sensations to appear in consciousness, rendered “meaningful”.¹⁵ The drive of
the preservation of the species extends in man to “promoting the faith in life”,
9 WP 255 (1883–84), Nietzsche 1968: 148 [KGWVII/1: 704]. Also relevant are several of the contri-
butions to Nietzsche on Freedom and Autonomy (Gemes/May 2009), especially those of Christo-
pher Janaway, Simon May, John Richardson, andMaudemarie Clark and David Dudrick.
10 GM II 22: “that suppressed cruelty of the animal man who has been frightened back into
himself and given an inner life, incarcerated in the ‘state’ to be tamed, and has discovered bad
conscience so that he can hurt himself, after themore natural outlet of this wish to hurt had been
blocked […]” (Nietzsche 1994: 63 [KGWVI/2: 348]).
11 WP 372 (Summer 1883), Nietzsche 1968: 200 [KGWVII/1: 352]. Translation modified.
12 GS 1, Nietzsche 2001: 27 [KGW V/2: 43]. In §53 Nietzsche refers to the “Verfeinerung of the evil
drive [den bösen Trieb]”, Nietzsche 2001: 63 (KGWV/2: 90).
13 GS 118, Nietzsche 2001: 116 [KGWV/2: 154].
14 GS 21, Nietzsche 2001: 43 [KGWV/2: 65].
15 TI, The Four Great Errors 4, Nietzsche 2005b: 50 [KGW VI/3: 86].
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giving rise to “Oughts and Becauses”, teachings concerning the purpose and
reason for existence.¹⁶ Each drive presents a “one-sided view of the thing or
event” but out of their conflict arises “a kind of justice and contract” whereby
each “can assert and maintain themselves in existence and each can finally feel
it is the right vis-à-vis all the others”; the drives “know very well how to make
themselves felt by and how to hurt each other” (they may even, for all we know,
exhibit “heroism”).¹⁷ In the unpublished notebooks Nietzsche talks of “our
drive to worship [unserem anbetenden Triebe]–that continually proves itself–by
providing guidance”,¹⁸ and of the unrest between “opposing value drives
[Werth-Trieben]”;¹⁹ “a single individual contains within him a vast confusion of
contradictory valuations and consequently of contradictory drives”, implying a
correspondence of drives and values;²⁰ one “seeks a picture of the world in that
philosophy in which we feel freest; i.e., in which our most powerful drive feels
free to function [sich frei fühlt zu seiner Thätigkeit]”²¹; “the will to logical truth
can be carried through only after a fundamental falsification of all events is
assumed. From which it follows that a drive rules here that is capable of employ-
ing both means, firstly falsification, then the implementation of its own point of
view: logic does not spring from will to truth.”²² In connection with perspecti-
vism Nietzsche says: “It is our needs that interpret the world; our drives and
their For and Against. Every drive is a kind of lust to rule; each one has its per-
spective that it would like to compel all the other drives to accept as a norm
[jeder hat seine Perspektive, welche er als Norm …].”²³
Drives, or at least some drives, have therefore for Nietzsche a perspective or
point of view and a sense of their own freedom, possess and deploy normative
conceptions, and direct themselves at complex worldly states of affairs; they
differ from full-blown personal agents, as ordinarily conceived, only in so far as
each is defined by a single motivational aim (or ‘value’). In psychoanalytic eyes,
this must be reckoned a mistake, which jeopardizes the coherence of depth psy-
chology: Nietzsche confounds the preconscious, which is merely descriptively
unconscious, with the dynamic unconscious, the contents of which could not
come to consciousness in the form in which they exist in Ucs. It will be added
16 GS 1, Nietzsche 2001: 28 [KGWV/2: 45].
17 GS 333, Nietzsche 2001: 185–186 [KGWV/2: 238–239].
18 WP 253 (Spring 1885), Nietzsche 1968: 146 [KGW VIII/1: 146].
19 WP 351 (1887–88), Nietzsche 1968: 192 [KGWVIII/2: 366].
20 WP 259 (1884), Nietzsche 1968: 149 [KGWVII/2: 181].
21 WP 418 (1883), Nietzsche 1968: 224–225 [KGW VII/1: 352].
22 WP 512 (1885), Nietzsche 1968: 277 [KGWVIII/3: 366].
23 WP 481 (1886–87), Nietzsche 1968: 267 [KGWVIII/1: 323].
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that Nietzsche fails to individuate mental parts independently of drives:
Nietzsche treats each drive as defining (and as all that defines) a different
mental part. In consequence of taking drive-identity as the principle of mental
partition, and of attributing strategic rationality to drives, Nietzsche’s psychol-
ogy falls into homuncularism, with all of its attendant paradoxes.²⁴ From all of
this a very different relation to ordinary psychology from psychoanalysis
emerges: whereas psychoanalysis, conservatively, postulates a background to
the attributions of common sense psychology which compensates for its limita-
tions, extending and completing our everyday explanations, Nietzsche is
engaged in rewriting ordinary psychology, contesting and supplanting a signifi-
cant portion of its attributions.
The orthodox Freudian, sceptical of Nietzschean psychology and wishing to
stress the originality of Freud’s achievement, will find further grounds for criti-
cism of Nietzsche. In addition to the absence of an explicit metapsychology, and
a failure to grasp the qualitative distinctions between the conscious and the
unconscious, Nietzsche’s psychologizing may be charged with epistemological
limitations and a lack of scientific objectivity: Nietzsche does not have, it will be
said, the clinical context–the experience of transference and all that follows
from it–as a means for close observation of unconscious mental life. Of equal
importance is the fact that Nietzsche’s psychology is not grounded on a strategy
of extension of common sense psychology. Freud proceeds by getting to grips
with phenomena that are already constituted as explananda before psychoana-
lysis arrives on the scene: the cast of Freud’s case histories are individuals who
have already avowed their own failure to understand themselves; ordinary psy-
chology does not pretend to know why we dream about this rather than that, or
why we have dreams at all; we plainly lack understanding of group behaviour,
moral fanaticism, totemic practices, and so on. The explanatory needs to which
psychoanalysis responds are thus fixed independently and antecedently.
Nietzsche’s psychological constructions are not guided by the same factors.
Rather, their direction is determined by Nietzsche’s value-driven selection of fea-
tures of psychological life (the will to power, a hypothesis which finds no echo
in Freud, may be cited as evidence of the incursions of an axiological agenda).
The upshot, the proponent of psychoanalysis may say, is that even when
Nietzsche’s speculations do contain some important insight, they fail to meet
the strict conditions of psychological knowledge.
24 If Ucs. shares the same content as Cs., then the unconscious holds beliefs, desires, engages in
practical reason, etc., i.e., amounts to a ‘second mind’. And this generates paradoxes, as Sartre
argued: see my Irrationality and the Philosophy of Psychoanalysis (Gardner 1993), Ch. 2.
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Whether or not these criticisms hit the mark, an issue which I will not
pursue, it should be emphasized that the fact that Nietzsche draws no qualita-
tive distinction between conscious and unconscious mental states is not a con-
ceptual oversight but plays a positive role in relation to his practical concerns. It
allows Nietzsche (first) to articulate his psychological analyses in ways that
address us at the personal level, somewhat in the way the French moralists
impugn our integrity and Kierkegaard confronts us with our double-minded-
ness–as psychoanalytic explanations certainly do not²⁵; and (second) it allows
drives to be considered as materials for self-creation, in a way that psychoanaly-
sis again does not–Nietzsche describes our drives in terms that permit our iden-
tification with them, our taking them up in a sense that is not possible for the
contents of Ucs.²⁶
4. I turn now to a second difference between Freudian and Nietzschean
psychology.
There is an obvious sense in which the drive model impinges on the unity of
the person. Personal unity, as ordinarily conceived, is not threatened by the
existence of a mere multiplicity of desires, even when these conflict, so long as
their fate stands under the control of a self which determines–blocks, restricts,
endorses, etc.–their efficacy. But this controlling self– its omnipotence, if not
existence– is exactly what the drive model contests.
The metaphysics of the self do not figure on Freud’s agenda, but his metap-
sychology has clear implications for the ‘I’, which it reduces to an aspect of ego
functioning: apperception registers the discursively formulated, more or less
satisfactory outcomes of the ego’s negotiations of its relations to the id and
superego and of the interaction of its various components with one another,
with special attention to their agreement, or lack of it, with social norms.²⁷ The
self, in the sense of what we grasp as the ‘I’, is merely an ancillary aspect of a
substantial entity that lacks any essential I-character, its relation to which the ‘I’
(constitutively) misrepresents:
Normally, there is nothing of which we are more certain than the feeling of our self, of our
own ego. This ego appears to us as something autonomous and unitary, marked off dis-
tinctly from everything else. That such an appearance is deceptive, and that on the con-
trary the ego is continued inwards, without any sharp delimitation, into an unconscious
25 For an example of a passage in which ‘French moralist’ critique is interwoven seamlessly with
depth psychology, see GS 14.
26 See for example D 560.
27 See Tugendhat 1986: 131–132.
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mental entity which we designate as the id and for which it serves as a kind of façade–this
was a discovery first made by psycho-analytic research.²⁸
Freud’s view of the ‘I’ is in line with Schopenhauer’s treatment of self-conscious-
ness. In the second chapter of his Essay on the Freedom of the Will Schopenhauer
offers the following account of the structure of willing.²⁹ In the most rudimentary
case, an object induces a reaction in the subject, a movement of will. At a
minimum this comprises a feeling of pleasure or pain, but when the reaction
extends to a projected modification of the object, and thus involves bodily move-
ment, we can speak of the object as the motive of an action: the volition is directed
at the object, which provides its content. Self-consciousness, Schopenhauer
insists, plays no active role in this process: it simply registers the various move-
ments of will. These constitute furthermore the total content of self-consciousness
in general, according to Schopenhauer: “nothing is present to the so-called inner
sense but one’s own will”.³⁰ Consciousness of oneself as deciding or resolving is,
on Schopenhauer’s account, simply a form of consciousness of a movement of
will.³¹ This minimal account agrees fully with Freud’s description of consciousness,
in the few places where he says anything about the topic, asmerely passive.³²
Nietzsche’s repudiation of the ‘I’ is well known. In statements such as the
following Nietzsche takes a more radical position than either Freud or Schopen-
hauer, not merely stripping the ‘I’ of its efficacy, or giving it reduced reality, but
denying its existence outright:
I will not stop emphasizing a tiny little fact that these superstitious men are loath to admit:
that a thought comes when “it” wants, and not when “I” want. It is, therefore, a falsifica-
tion of the facts to say that the subject “I” is the condition of the predicate “think”. It
thinks: but to say the “it” is just that famous old “I”–well that is just an assumption or
opinion, to put it mildly, and by no means an “immediate certainty”.³³
[T]he path lies open for new versions and sophistications of the soul hypothesis; and con-
cepts like the “mortal soul” and the “soul as subject-multiplicity” and the “soul as a
society constructed out of drives and affects” want henceforth to have civil rights in the
realm of science.³⁴
28 Civilization and its Discontents (henceforth: CD), CD 64–65.
29 Schopenhauer 2010 [1839]: 44.
30 Schopenhauer 2010 [1839]: 51.
31 Schopenhauer 2010 [1839]: 45–48.
32 See for example “A note upon the ‘mystic writing-pad’” (1925 [1924]), in Freud, SE 19:
227–234. (Here and hereafter, “Freud, SE” refers to the Standard Edition of the Complete Psycholo-
gical Works of Sigmund Freud.)
33 BGE 17, Nietzsche 2002: 17 [KGWVI/2: 24–25].
34 BGE 12, Nietzsche 2002: 14 [KGWVI/2: 20–21].
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According to Nietzsche’s new psychology of subjective multiplicity, each of us is
“only a society constructed out of many souls […] All willing is simply a matter
of commanding and obeying, on the groundwork, as I have said, of a society
constructed out of many ‘souls’.”³⁵ Even Schopenhauer’s “I will”, which, as
said, amounts to only an attenuated form of self-consciousness, is classified by
Nietzsche as a “superstition”.³⁶
It is possible to regard Nietzsche as simply following out and making expli-
cit the implications of the drive model as it is formulated by Schopenhauer: if
self-consciousness is reduced to a mere power of receptivity in relation to voli-
tions, and if the contribution of transcendental subjectivity to the unity of self-
consciousness (which is in any case problematic) is bracketed out, then it is not
at all clear that anything remains to give reality to the idea that something iden-
tical is present in the multiplicity of acts of will.³⁷ If so, then the unity of the
person reduces to the functional unity of animal individuality: movements of
will, or drives, share a common subject just in so far as there is one continuous
organismic boundary containing their operations and constraining them to
contest one another’s efficacy; nothing holds them together on the inside in the
way that the ‘I’ was held to do. If Nietzsche regards this as amounting to elimi-
nation rather than reduction, then it is because he has a different, arguably
sharper sense of our conceptual investments in the ‘I’.
5. This is however another side to Nietzsche’s view of the ‘I’. Nietzsche’s practi-
cal philosophy employs a conception of the self which is not warranted by and
which appears to contradict the drive model.³⁸ Nietzsche does not recommend
the Schopenhauerian annihilation of selfhood that would result from eliminat-
ing the illusion of the I will: on the contrary, I-hood is integral to the condition of
higher life-affirmative existence to which we should aspire. The theme is promi-
nent throughout Nietzsche’s writings. In Daybreak, II, §105, “Pseudo-egoism”,
Nietzsche endorses an ideal of higher or intensified selfhood: the great majority
have no selves to speak of, merely ‘phantom’ selves (“das Phantom von ego”)
35 BGE 19, Nietzsche 2002: 19–20 [KGW VI/2: 27]. See also the denial that our unity owes any-
thing to consciousness in GS 11; Nietzsche attributes it instead to “the preserving alliance of the
instincts” (Nietzsche 2001: 37 [KGW V/2: 56]). And TI Errors 3: “Not to mention the I! That has
become a fairy tale, a fiction, a play on words: it has stopped thinking, feeling, and willing alto-
gether!” (Nietzsche 2005b: 178 [KGWVI/3: 85]).
36 BGE 16, Nietzsche 2002: 16 [KGWVI/2: 23].
37 Schopenhauer himself arguably avoids this, but only through his doctrine of the Idea of the
individual, as giving necessary unity to the movements of will.
38 See my “Nietzsche, the Self, and the Disunity of Philosophical Reason” (Gardner 2009),
section 1.3.
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that they have received from others–“no individual among this majority is
capable of setting up a real ego, accessible to him and fathomed by him, in
opposition to the general pale fiction”.³⁹ In Daybreak, II, §108, Nietzsche invokes
the self in a reformulation of the Kantian formula of autonomy: once we have
disposed of the moral law qua something that is “supposed to stand above our
own likes and dislikes”, mankind might “impose upon itself a moral law”,
prompted by feeling but “at its own discretion”.⁴⁰ A notebook entry confirms
Nietzsche in the view that “I will” represents a different form of consciousness
from mere drive, and one that is axiologically higher: “Schopenhauer’s basic
misunderstanding of the will (as if craving, instinct, drive were the essence of
will) is typical: lowering the value of the will to the point of atrophy. Also hatred
against willing; attempt to see something higher, indeed that which is higher
and valuable, in willing no more […]”.⁴¹
Is Nietzsche aware of the rub between his theoretical dissolution of the self
and his ethical ideal of substantial individuality? Whether he regards it as a phi-
losophical problem in its own right is hard to determine, but there is evidence
that he is at least aware that the self-representation of the practical perspective
is discrepant with the theoretical drive model.
In Daybreak, II, §109, Nietzsche concerns himself with the available
methods of “combating the vehemence of a drive”. For the first three quarters of
this passage, Nietzsche details a variety of methods, six to be precise, that we
may adopt with a view to defeating, or draining of force, a desire that presses on
us chronically and that we wish to be rid of. We may, first, weaken the desire by
avoiding opportunities for its gratification; second, secure periods of release
from its pressure by imposing a regular schedule on its gratification; third,
indulge it to the point of disgust and satiety; fourth, forge an association of its
fulfilment with some painful experience; fifth, drain its reservoir of mental and
physical energy by engaging in other activities; and sixth, generally depress our
level of activity to the point of exhaustion through ascetic deprivation.
The stance adopted by Nietzsche in detailing these techniques is the one
found in any stoic manual of management of the passions or self-help guide: we
look down on drives from above, where ‘above’ means from where I am, the per-
sonal rather than sub-personal standpoint of the judging and willing agent, set
to intercede in the goings-on of his or her psychology. From this standpoint, the
39 D 105, Nietzsche 1982: 61 [KGWV/1: 90–91].
40 D 108, Nietzsche 1982: 63–64 [KGW V/1: 94]. For passages which leave no doubt concerning
the ‘I’-centric shape of Nietzschean value, see GS 338 and GS 345.
41 WP 84, (Autumn 1887) [KGWVIII/2: 99]. Translation modified.
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drive figures as a would-be usurper: it wishes to “play the master”⁴² and can be
regarded as suffering from confusion regarding its own proper psychological
status (whence its perceived illegitimacy).
Nietzsche draws particular attention to the connection of this top-down per-
spective with a sense of one’s own value:
The same method is also being employed when a man’s pride, as for example in the case
of Lord Byron or Napoleon, rises up and feels the domination of his whole bearing and the
ordering of his reason by a single affect as an affront: from where there then arises the
habit and desire to tyrannise over the drive and make it as it were gnash its teeth. (“I
refuse to be the slave of any appetite,” Byron wrote in his diary.)⁴³
Having exposited the six methods, Nietzsche abruptly– in mid-sentence, without
breaking stride–loops back reflexively on the presiding I, with the following
contention:
[…]: that one desires to combat the vehemence of a drive at all, however, does not stand
within our own power; nor does the choice of any particular method; nor does the success
or failure of this method. What is clearly the case is that in this entire procedure our intel-
lect is only the blind instrument of another drive which is a rival of the drive whose vehe-
mence is tormenting us: whether it be the drive to restfulness, or the fear of disgrace and
other evil consequences, or love. While “we” believe we are complaining about the vehe-
mence of a drive, at bottom it is one drive which is complaining about another […].⁴⁴
The effect is deflating and disorienting: the sensation of Byronic self-mastery
which Nietzsche has been stoking is dissipated. We find ourselves dispossessed
in a sense in which we were not at the outset, for we began by pitting ourselves
against a power that resisted our will, but have learned that whatever we might
reckon as an exercise of our will is in truth of the very same order as that which
we previously took to be subordinate to it.
So far, so Freudian. But Nietzsche takes one further step. Concluding the
passage, Nietzsche observes that, because our suffering from a drive “presup-
poses the existence of another equally vehement or even more vehement drive”,
“a struggle is in prospect in which our intellect is going to have to take sides [in
welchem unser Intellekt Partei nehmen muß]”.⁴⁵ This last clause is crucial.
Nietzsche has confronted the first-person practical standpoint of putatively self-
42 D 109, Nietzsche 1982: 65 [KGWV/1: 96].
43 D 109, Nietzsche 1982: 64 [KGW V/1: 95]. See also the first paragraph of BGE 257, concerning
the inner pathos of distance required for enhancement of the type ‘man’.
44 D 109, Nietzsche 1982: 64 [KGW V/1: 96–97].
45 D 109, Nietzsche 1982: 65 [KGW V/1: 97].
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determining agency with the third-person theoretical standpoint of sub-personal
psychological analysis, and allowed the former to collapse in favour of the
latter, but he does not give the third person the last word: in his coda, as we
turn to the future, practical necessity returns and our personal status is restored,
for we are intellects that are “going to have to take sides”.⁴⁶
If we are aware of ourselves as having to take sides, it follows that Schopen-
hauer’s analysis of self-consciousness is incomplete. The problem of course is
that, at this point, though we are in no doubt that we must understand ourselves
to have the task of taking sides, we are no longer clear what this amounts to, or
in what way it can be true that we have this capacity, since the very notion of
‘taking sides’–that is, the concept of a relation to a drive of something that is
not itself a drive, as distinct from a relation among drives–has been shown to
make sense only from within a perspective that the drive model eliminates. The
puzzle is therefore as follows: Granted the double inescapability of both (1) a
first-person practical perspective in which we must take it to be up to us what is
to be done with and about our drives, and (2) a third-person theoretical perspec-
tive in which drives decide what happens or is done with us, what mediation is
possible? In short, where next?
Nietzsche does not say. Later sections in Book II of Daybreak reinforce the
perplexing finality of §109. In §119 Nietzsche blocks the supposition that the
Intellekt could at least cognitively master the drives: they supervene on physio-
logical processes in irrational ways, that we could not hope to grasp, such that
there is “no essential difference” between the way that drives are expressed in
dream and our awareness of them in waking experience⁴⁷; nothing “can be more
incomplete” than an individual’s “image of the totality of drives which consti-
tute his being”.⁴⁸ Since the tangle of drives cannot be rendered transparent, the
notion of a judgement-based, drive-transcendent intervention in one’s volitional
processes–even if there were a presiding ‘I’ to undertake it–is empty. And in
§129 Nietzsche repeats the exercise in self-alienation of §109, telling us that in
certain cases of conflicts of motives, “what I finally do” may be the effect of
46 As coheres with the broader argument of Book II of Daybreak, which has arrived, in the con-
clusion of the immediately preceding section, at the point where we are to consider choosing the
moral law. That the self is an illusion is indicated in other passages in the vicinity of §109:
mankind confuses “the active and the passive”–it mistakes being acted upon for acting (D 120,
Nietzsche 1982: 76–77 [KGW V/1: 113]); we naively accord plain truth to “I will” (D 124, Nietzsche
1982: 77 [KGW V/1: 114]); “the so-called ‘ego’ [das sogenannte ‘Ich’]” is merely one element in the
construction of character (D 115, Nietzsche 1982: 72 [KGWV/1: 106]).
47 D 119, Nietzsche 1982: 75 [KGWV/1: 111].
48 D 119, Nietzsche 1982: 74 [KGWV/1:109].
14 Nietzsche and Freud: The ‘I’ and Its Drives  381
Brought to you by | UCL - University College London
Authenticated
Download Date | 2/26/19 12:12 PM
“something quite invisible to us” of which we are “quite unconscious”–all the
while sustaining a contrast of “unconscious processes” with the standpoint of
an ‘I’ that anxiously calculates consequences and outcomes, forms a unified
“picture of the consequences”, and reflects in preparation for the act which it
takes itself to have resolved upon.⁴⁹
Now at this point two routes are open. On the one hand we might seek an
interpretation that renders Nietzsche’s claims consistent. For instance, we might
look for an interpretation of the ideal of the ‘real ego’ that does not presuppose
the reality of an effective Intellekt,⁵⁰ or deny that Nietzsche is obligated to recog-
nize a tension here at all.⁵¹ The alternative is to release Nietzsche’s position from
the threat of inconsistency by construing it as frankly aporetic–and to then go
on to explain why in Nietzsche’s terms, that is, with his specific philosophical
objectives in view, such a result can be allowed to stand.⁵²
I cannot substantiate the claim here, but it seems to me that in Nietzsche’s
works at large there is no sustained attempt at a positive dissolution of the con-
flict dramatized in Daybreak, II, §109, and that attempts to locate a consistent
non-aporetic position in Nietzsche, however ingenious, go against the grain,
letter, and spirit of Nietzsche’s texts. As a brief indication of the difficulties that
lie in wait for such interpretations, it is striking that Nietzsche in Daybreak, II,
§119, describes the very vocabulary in which he conceives drives–viz., as self-
interested homunculi-agents which (or who) desire gratification, exercise and
discharge their strength, and seek to fill their emptiness–as “all metaphors [es
ist Alles Bilderrede]”.⁵³ Nietzsche appears to be saying that our very concept of a
drive is conditioned by the ‘I’ in the sense (first) that drives are grasped as
things that figure for the ‘I’ in so far as it sets itself in relation (resisting, etc.) to
them, with the consequence (second) that if we raise up drives and have them
supplant the ‘I’, then we are bound to give them its conceptual character, and so
49 D 129, Nietzsche 1982: 129–130 [KGWV/1: 116–118].
50 See Gemes 2009, which interprets Nietzsche’s conception of genuine selfhood in terms of sub-
servience to a single “master drive”. In my view, Nietzsche is not rigorously third personal and
does not suppose it meaningful to attribute ‘master’ status to a drive and to identify the achieve-
ment of selfhood with its hegemony independently from the perspective of self-consciousness. It
seems to me, for example, that the passage in Ecce Homo (EH, Why I Am So Clever 9) from which
Gemes quotes as supporting his view (Gemes 2009: 47) makes sense only when Nietzsche’s
unconscious (master) drive–to complete the ‘task of revaluing values’–is viewed in the perspec-
tive of what Nietzsche can call his life and affirm as such: “Nach dieser Seite hin betrachtet ist
mein Leben einfach wundervoll” (KGW VI/3: 292–293).
51 For consideration of this possibility, see Anderson 2013.
52 See my (2009).
53 D 119, Nietzsche 1982: 74 [KGWV/1: 110].
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to think of them in terms that are literally false.⁵⁴ Taken at face value, then,
Nietzsche’s idea, espoused by contemporary eliminativists, seems to be that the
conceptual scheme of intentional psychology is incapable of representing the
true inner causes of behaviour. And given the mountain of remarks in Nietzsche
concerning the superficiality and epistemic incompetence of consciousness, this
would hardly be a surprising conclusion for him to have reached; consciousness
could not have been expected to determine correctly the nature of the mind.⁵⁵
But if that is so, then Nietzsche’s position seems doubly strange: the psychologi-
cal substrate in favour of which the ‘I’ was eliminated has turned out to itself
have only a limited kind and degree of reality; we seem to be moving sideways,
from one fiction to another, rather than out of fiction into psychological truth.
Nietzsche hints as much in Beyond Good and Evil:
By putting an end to the superstition that until now has grown around the idea of the soul
with an almost tropical luxuriance, the new psychologist clearly thrusts himself into a new
wasteland and a new suspicion […] the new psychologist knows by this very token that he
is condemned to invention–and, who knows?, perhaps to discovery.⁵⁶
If only for reasons of this sort, concerning the resistance of Nietzsche’s texts to
regimentation and the heavy interpolations required in order for Nietzsche to
emerge as a thinker with a positive systematic account, it seems to me better
to say that what we get (and are meant to get) from Nietzsche is not a solution to
the puzzle presented in Daybreak, II, §109, but clarified and indeed intensified
awareness of the more general conflict which it exemplifies, that of the deliver-
ances of the will to truth and the needs of life: the opposition of theoretical
reason and practical reason, I suggest, subsumes the opposition of the drive
model and the ‘I’, of which it is a specific instance; the drive-transcendent per-
spective of the ‘I’ belongs with the other fundamental illusions, constitutive
54 BGE 17: “It thinks: but to say the ‘it’ is just that famous old ‘I’–well that is just an assumption
or opinion, to put it mildly, and by no means an ‘immediate certainty’. In fact, there is already
too much packed into the ‘it thinks’: even the ‘it’ contains an interpretation of the process, and
does not belong to the process itself. People are following grammatical habits here in drawing
conclusions, reasoning that ‘thinking is an activity, behind every activity something is active,
therefore–’.” (Nietzsche 2002: 17–18 [KGW VI/2: 25]). And TI, The Four Great Errors 3: “There
are no mental causes whatsoever [gar keine geistigen Ursachen]!” (Nietzsche 2005b: 178) [KGW
VI/3: 85].
55 As claimed explicitly in D 115: “We are none of us that which we appear to be in accordance
with the states for which alone we have consciousness and words […] we misread ourselves in
this apparently most intelligible of handwriting on the nature of ourselves” (Nietzsche 1982:
71–72 [KGW V/1: 105–106]).
56 BGE 12, Nietzsche 2002: 14–15 [KGWVI/2: 21].
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errors, that have grown out of the needs of life. Priests and philosophers have
however raised this error to a higher power, and their hypostatization and valor-
ization of the ‘I’ has been internalized. Consequently, there is reason to confront
it with the drive model: the ‘I’ may be ineliminable, but undermining the integ-
rity of the concept of a self-legislating and drive-transcendent ‘I’ helps to dis-
lodge the (Judeo-Christian, Kantian) modes of evaluation associated with it.⁵⁷
Whether the drive model might itself positively assist in value creation–a possi-
bility which Nietzsche seems not to rule out⁵⁸–exposing the conflict of theoreti-
cal knowledge and practical existence serves a purpose: it reorientates us
towards the needs of life, free from the illusion that our practical problems are
amenable to theoretical solutions.⁵⁹ I will say some more about this in the next
section.
For the narrower purpose of differentiating Nietzsche from Freud, it does
not matter ultimately which of the two alternatives is accepted. On either view,
Nietzsche is committed to something that is not to be found in Freud: not the
existence of a full-blown entity but an ineliminable, quasi-transcendental neces-
57 Tom Stern has suggested to me that it also allows us to recapture innocence of a sort, in so far
as we shake off the burden of an intrinsically morally characterized self. The return to innocence
is hailed in TI, The Four Great Errors 8, where it concludes an extended attack on the will in the
name of psychological explanation.
58 As hinted in the quotation above from BGE 12, concerning the “new psychologist”–which
one may read in light of Nietzsche’s experimental attitude towards scepticism (GS 51). I am grate-
ful to Tom Stern for drawing my attention to other relevant passages: GS 335 presents a three-part
movement: in the name of “physics” Nietzsche (i) decomposes our notion of intellectual con-
science into homuncular elements, (ii) turns this conclusion against the categorial imperative,
and (iii) refers this result, again in the name of “physics”, to the practical perspective, our interest
in becoming “those we are” and creators of new values (Nietzsche 2001: 187–188 [KGW V/2:
240–244]). In D 560 Nietzsche (again invoking the personal stance) invites us to contemplate our
drives and to recognize that we are at liberty to cultivate them in different ways.
59 Central to this reorientation is an aesthetic turn, of which we find no equivalent in Freud. It is
helpful to compare Nietzsche in this regard with Schiller, who is preoccupied with very similar
issues of psychological constitution and personal unity, and whose analysis of human personal-
ity in terms of the form-drive and sense-drive in the Letters on Aesthetic Education no doubt
impressed itself on Nietzsche, its influence being clearly visible in The Birth of Tragedy. Schiller
recognizes a problematic complexity in the structure of personality which does not appear in
Kant, and his conception of a drive is consistently non-psychoanalytic. Schiller however does not
think that the complexity of drive-structure impugns the reality of the ‘I’: it can for Schiller be
contained within, and must be understood in terms of, the unity of the ‘I’ (which is the crux of the
transcendental argument for the possibility of the play-drive that he offers in Letters 18–22). And
because for Schiller there is no aporia in selfhood as such, wholeness of human personality can
in principle be achieved, by aesthetic means. Nietzsche by contrast invokes the aesthetic as com-
pensation for disunity, or so I have argued in Gardner 2013.
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sity, that of the first-person practical point of view, incongruent with the theore-
tical image of the mind.
6. I have argued for two principal differences of philosophical psychology
between Nietzsche and Freud. First, Nietzsche does not draw the distinction of
psychological parts and corresponding kinds of mental state drawn by Freud.
This makes Nietzschean psychology revisionary (in relation to ordinary psychol-
ogy) in a way that psychoanalysis is not. Second, Nietzsche adopts a complex
stand regarding the reality of the ‘I’, which he excises from the theoretical psy-
chological picture while affirming its ineliminability from the first-person practi-
cal point of view, in contrast to Freud, who does not see the ‘I’ as raising any
issues not resolved in his metapsychology. In addition I have indicated the con-
nection of Nietzsche’s differences from psychoanalysis with his practical orien-
tation: Nietzsche’s psychological analyses are intended to work in concert with
his ethical aims. Finally, I have cast doubt on the assumption that Nietzsche
regards his drive psychology in unequivocally realist terms, a contrast with
Freud that can again be attributed to Nietzsche’s practical ambitions, in so far as
his new psychology aims ultimately not at true explanation for its own sake, but
at therapeutic results.⁶⁰ The contrast of Nietzsche with Freud on issues of practi-
cal philosophy, their difference of axiology rather than philosophical psychol-
ogy, is what I want to expand on in this final section.
Nietzsche’s contemptuous repudiation of happiness as an ethical value is
well known.⁶¹ Freud’s theorizing about practical matters–which to be sure does
not amount to a moral philosophy, but which involves a commitment to a scale
of value–refers to nothing else. Indeed Freud asserts that facts of pain and plea-
sure, suffering and satisfaction, are the sole considerations to which it makes
sense to refer in estimation of the human condition, now that the question of
the meaning of life has, with the vanishing of religious belief, itself become
meaningless:
The question of the purpose of human life has been raised countless times; it has never yet
received a satisfactory answer and perhaps does not admit of one. Some of those who have
asked it have added that if it should turn out that life has no purpose, it would lose all
value for them. But this threat alters nothing. […] [O]nly religion can answer the question
60 Psychoanalysis aims of course at therapeutic results, but it also aims at theoretical truth for
its own sake.
61 E.g., BGE 198, BGE 200, BGE 225, BGE 228. Whether Nietzsche does, or could, find some place
for some conception of happiness is not the issue here: the point is just that he rejects it as a
value in the (key, intentional object) sense of something at which one may aim and from which
life-affirmation may derive.
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of the purpose of life. One can hardly be wrong in concluding that the idea of life having a
purpose stands and falls with the religious system.
We will therefore turn to the less ambitious question of what men themselves show by
their behaviour to be the purpose and intention of their lives. What do they demand of life
and wish to achieve in it? The answer to this can hardly be in doubt. They strive after hap-
piness; they want to become happy and to remain so. This endeavour has two sides, a posi-
tive and a negative aim. It aims, on the one hand, at an absence of pain and unpleasure,
and, on the other, at the experiencing of strong feelings of pleasure. In its narrower sense
the word “happiness” only relates to the last. In conformity with this dichotomy in his
aims, man’s activity develops in two directions, according as it seeks to realize–in the
main, or even exclusively–the one or the other of these aims.
As we see, what decides the purpose of life is simply the programme of the pleasure princi-
ple. This principle dominates the operation of the mental apparatus from the start.⁶²
Proceeding on this basis, Civilisation and its Discontents argues that the suffering
which is specifically due to civilization (and which, Freud notes, so many of his
contemporaries complain of) is functionally necessary: it is fixed by the invar-
iant psychological constitution of human beings, the quantity and quality of our
instinctual input, in conjunction with the objective circumstances of social
order, the arrangements required to control aggression, and it is roughly justi-
fied on a utilitarian calculus; lifting the restrictions of civilized life would bring
no overall gain.
The programme of becoming happy, which the pleasure principle imposes on us, cannot
be fulfilled; yet we must not–indeed, we cannot–give up our efforts to bring it nearer to
fulfilment by some means or other. Very different paths may be taken in that direction,
and we may give priority either to the positive aspect of the aim, that of gaining pleasure,
or to its negative one, that of avoiding unpleasure. By none of these paths can we attain all
that we desire. Happiness, in the reduced sense in which we recognize it as possible, is a
problem of the economics of the individual’s libido.⁶³
Some limited scope remains for remedial action, therefore. Freud accordingly cri-
ticizes certain institutions as dysfunctional–the norms of modern marriage, he
argues, are responsible for an undue level of sexual dissatisfaction,⁶⁴ and reli-
gion does not deliver on its hedonic promises⁶⁵–but it is not Freud’s view that a
62 CD, 74–75.
63 CD, 82.
64 “ ‘Civilized’ Sexual Morality andModern Nervous Illness” [1908], in Freud, SE 9: 177–204.
65 CD, 83–84: “Its technique consists in depressing the value of life and distorting the picture of
the real world in a delusional manner […] by forcibly fixing them in a state of psychical infanti-
lism and by drawing them into a mass-delusion, religion succeeds in sparing many people an
individual neurosis. But hardly anything more.”
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revision of our values can mitigate significantly the suffering arising from the
renunciation of instinctual satisfaction which civilization presupposes, which is
bound to remain at a roughly constant level; and since nothing else could give it
sense, axiological change is not for Freud a meaningful possibility. There is con-
sequently in Freud no analogue of Nietzsche’s non-utilitarian notions of indivi-
dual and cultural flourishing, or of failure thereof, and Freud does not suggest
that we are tending to a nihilistic climax; rather, it is modern warfare, a very
material threat, that poses the main danger for Freud.⁶⁶ Again, Freud does not
follow Nietzsche’s critique of modern secular reason: since the comforts of reli-
gion were of very limited efficacy, Freud sees nothing to regret in the hegemony
of the will to truth. Because Freud’s pessimistic, stoical conservativism derives
directly from his empirical claims concerning (i) the universal and unalterable
laws governing human psychology, and (ii) the social structures which they
necessitate,⁶⁷ it can be challenged on terms that Freud would accept only by dis-
puting one or both of the latter (as attempted in the Frankfurt School).
What is responsible for this very considerable difference of outlook? No
mystery attaches to Freud’s utilitarianism, the grounds of which are familiar and
transparent, and which can plausibly be viewed as the default position for a nat-
uralist of Freud’s sort. The question is rather why Nietzsche, given that he too
rejects so much of what is required for any non-utilitarian scheme of values, is
so uncompromisingly opposed to Freud’s axiological standpoint.
There is an obvious suggestion to be made concerning the root of
Nietzsche’s anti-hedonism. We may return to Nietzsche’s dissatisfaction with
Schopenhauer, and observe that the pessimism of Schopenhauer’s that
Nietzsche resists so fiercely is grounded on hedonic considerations. There is for
Schopenhauer an intrinsic wrongness (‘injustice’) to individuated existence as
such, but what converts this metaphysical ‘fact’ into a motive for denial of the
will to live is the phenomenal suffering to which it directly gives rise: the struc-
ture of willing, Schopenhauer argues, entails a priori the impossibility of happi-
ness, to which the miserable character of human life bears witness a posteriori.
Nietzsche does not endorse Schopenhauer’s analysis of pleasure and pain,
but he does not dispute Schopenhauer’s account of the balance sheet of human
weal and woe; in those terms Nietzsche allows Silenus the last word. Nietzsche’s
counter-pessimistic strategy focusses instead on the reception of suffering, the
way that it is construed, and which determines its bearing on the will. A passage
66 “Thoughts for the Times on Death and War” [1915], in: Freud, SE 14: 273–300, esp. Part I,
“The Disillusionment of War”.
67 See Deigh 1986.
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in The Gay Science puts the point in focus. After noting that we moderns have
relatively reduced acquaintance with bodily pain, Nietzsche observes that
‘pain is hated much more now than formerly; one speaks much worse of it; indeed, one
can hardly endure the presence of pain as a thought and makes it a matter of conscience
and a reproach against the whole of existence’.⁶⁸
In this passage Nietzsche implies that our inability to tolerate suffering is mere
squeamishness on our part (which we might be cured of by a strong blast of real
first-order pain), but his fully developed view, set forth in On the Genealogy of
Morals, is that suffering has become intolerable to modern man not, or not just,
because of the exaggerated delicacy of his sensibility–a simple matter of mental
fabric–but because of his unmet demand that suffering have meaning, a prop-
erty that Nietzsche connects closely with rational explanation and justification.⁶⁹
The complexity that Nietzsche identifies in suffering sets him in disagreement
with Freud, for whom “[in] the last analysis, all suffering is nothing else than
sensation”.⁷⁰
Now the interesting–and very difficult–question is what Nietzsche makes
of this insight, more exactly, what stand he wants to take regarding the need for
Sinn. The plain therapeutic implication of Nietzsche’s diagnosis is that the
beliefs and dispositions responsible for our incapacity to tolerate suffering need
to be exorcised, and clearly it is a central ambition of Nietzsche’s to eradicate
the notion that suffering shows existence to be something evil (by inducing us
either to interpret suffering in a different way or to desist from interpreting it at
all). But two quite opposite rationales for undertaking to eliminate the need for
Sinn are possible, one of which is entirely consistent with the hedonic axiology
of Schopenhauer and Freud. If the problem is simply that we suffer twice over,
our second-order suffering weighing on us more heavily than our first-order
pain, then there is a hedonic reason for targeting the Sinn-needing disposition,
namely, on account of its disutility. This of course cannot be Nietzsche’s view:
Nietzsche does not recommend (as Freud well might) that we attempt to cease
asking for suffering to have meaning because doing so makes us unhappier
than we might otherwise be. But in that case, there is a hard question that
68 GS 48, Nietzsche 2001: 61 [KGWV/2: 88].
69 See especially §28 of the Third Essay (discussed in my (2009), section 3.2). That Nietzsche dis-
tinguishes mere sensitivity from need-for-Sinn in its modern, rationalistically conditioned form is
shown by the fact that he attributes the former, but not of course the latter, to the unsocratized
Homeric Greeks: BT 3, Nietzsche 1993: 23 [KGW III/1: 32].
70 CD, 77.
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Nietzsche must answer, and that appears to expose a tension in his position. In
the name of which value(s) does Nietzsche reject utility? Had Nietzsche expos-
ited a positive ethics, equipped with a justification independent of his anti-
hedonism, then the question might have a clear answer, but we do not of course
find anything so cut and dried in Nietzsche; on the contrary, if we want to deter-
mine what Nietzsche’s values amount to, then we need to work in the other
direction, that is, extrapolate his values from his critiques of hedonism, Kantian-
ism, and so on. Nor is the question answered by the thesis that values are (to be)
created, for–aside from the point that it is not clear why desire satisfaction
could not be created as a value–it is precisely the intelligibility of value-creation
that, for the Freudian ethical naturalist, stands in need of explanation and justi-
fication: before we can get to the point of positing (say) ‘becoming what one is’
or ‘real ego-hood’ as a value, we first need to know that it makes sense to envi-
sage anything other than hedonic facts as candidates for the Good. To regard
Nietzsche in this way, as under pressure to justify his rejection of a hedonic
axiology, does not require, note, that we interpret him as a fully committed nat-
uralist: it arises simply from his having apparently stripped out of existence all
of the features that would rationalize any conception of value that goes beyond
desire-satisfaction. So, to repeat, there is a puzzle: Whence for Nietzsche the
freedom from natural fact required in order to espouse values other than desire
satisfaction? Or, as it might also be put, whence the very idea of value as
opposed to fact? In one sense, of course, the answer to the question is plain:
history has made available to Nietzsche a non-naturalistic conception of value.
Nietzsche has as keen a sense as any rationalist of the ‘queerness’ of value, the
spectacular alteration in the order of things effected by the emergence of a
value-positing creature, the work of imagination and hallucinations of depth
required in order for human beings to experience and interpret the world as an
axiological domain. This explains very well why Nietzsche should think that we,
having acquired a taste for trans-natural values, cannot be satisfied with mere
desire-satisfaction–our problem lies, Nietzsche shows, one step back, in our
inability to form desires, our finding no reason to desire⁷¹–but it does not
explain why Nietzsche thinks that he is within his rights to, as it were, carry on
playing the same game as his anti-naturalistic predecessors, the game that
Freud clear-sightedly throws over.
If this is right, then Nietzsche faces a dilemma: either he condemns hedonic
axiology on the basis that it does not answer to our need for Sinn, in which case
he is obliged to grant the latter validity, which seems contrary to Nietzsche’s
71 See Pippin 2010, Ch. 1.
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aim of detaching life affirmation from rational reflection; or he follows Freud in
repudiating the need for Sinn and treating it purely as an object of psychological
and historical explanation, in which case he has no grounds for refusing a
hedonic axiology.
The problem reveals itself most acutely when we consider Nietzsche from
Freud’s perspective, but this does not represent the limit of its interest, for what
has been brought to light is the extreme thinness of the line that Nietzsche is
trying to walk between, on the one hand, an axiology of the self in the modern
(Rousseauian, Kantian, post-Kantian, German Romantic) tradition, which
attempts to meet the demands of reflection, and on the other, the naturalistically
reduced conceptions of value that are all that appear to remain when the
grounds of non-naturalistic conceptions of the Good have been removed.
Earlier I suggested that the Freudian will take a critical view of Nietzsche’s
depth psychology, and the same, I have just argued, occurs in the sphere of
value: viewed psychoanalytically, Nietzsche’s project of axiological transfor-
mation falls outside the bounds of natural possibility and has nothing to
recommend it; we are not defective for life in any way that it makes sense to
lament or that could be fundamentally overcome; suffering has Sinn enough by
virtue of being scientifically explicable; the relief that psychoanalysis brings
by showing that our anxieties, neuroses and so on derive from natural sources
is as much as can be hoped for. If this leaves existential demands unsatisfied,
then these must be reckoned a trick of the light, an optical illusion created by
our constitutive introversion and underpinned by two millennia of slave meta-
physics. Since Nietzsche knows perfectly well that the needs of the spirit are
infected with error– it is his own insight that, with the internalization of the
instincts, the inner world expands and becomes populated with fictive enti-
ties⁷²–the puzzle lies in his refusal to accept that in the cold light of the
present day we can no longer justifiably allow our axiological expectations to
be conditioned by anything other than hard, scientifically attested psychologi-
cal fact.
This critique of Nietzsche’s axiological project raises many questions which
cannot be pursued here, but there is one important point to be made concerning
the connection of Nietzsche’s rejection of hedonist axiology with his difference
from Freud concerning the ‘I’. If Nietzsche’s diagnosis is correct, then relinquish-
ing the possibility of non-hedonic value comes at a much heavier price than
Freud supposes–the implications are, as Schopenhauer supposes, catastrophic,
72 GM II 16. And TI, The Four Great Errors 3: “The ‘inner world’ is full of illusions and phan-
tasms” (Nietzsche 2005b: 178) [KGWVI/3: 85], and BGE 16, Nietzsche 2002: 16 [KGWVI/2: 23].
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and Freud is quite mistaken in thinking that the threat of life’s losing all
meaning ‘alters nothing’. This immediately gives Nietzsche leverage: if our need
for Sinn, or at any rate, our incapacity to tolerate hard unadorned natural fact, is
a fixed parameter, then it is practically necessary that we work within it, that is,
that we employ (in the spirit of “I must go on dreaming lest I perish”⁷³) whatever
axiological devices are required in order for life to preserve itself. But in appeal-
ing at this point to practical necessity as a ground for value creation, it is abso-
lutely necessary that Nietzsche affirm the value and the authority of the stand-
point of life–since this is exactly what Schopenhauer will dispute. (What is it to
invoke ‘practical necessity’, Schopenhauer will object, but to repeat, insanely,
the error of the Wille zum Leben that his philosophy has incontrovertibly
exposed?) And it is at this point that we see how important the drive-transcen-
dent ‘I’ is to Nietzsche, for it is from and only from its perspective that the stand-
point of life presents itself as valid, and can assert itself as rightful, as mere
drive cannot. The transcendence of theoretical reason by practical conscious-
ness–the movement whereby life projects itself beyond the facts of suffering– is
available only to a self-determining ‘I’ which, even when theoretical reason has
concluded that the game is not worth the candle, can still elect to will.⁷⁴ If this is
correct, then there is in Nietzsche an echo of Kant’s ‘primacy of practical reason’
and of Fichte’s Thathandlung–on a very different basis and in a very different
form, to be sure, but a recognizably transcendentalist residue nonetheless.⁷⁵
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